ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE
ESSAY #1
A small Mississauga electronics safety
equipment company is broken
into. Although
filing cabinets and desks were rummaged through, nothing
was seemingly
taken. An officer discovered the company had drawn up a bid
for $7 million
dollar contract a day or so before the break-in. The contract in
question was for
a foreign country. It was later discovered that the company
in question was
known for its aggressive economic espionage. An iron ore
shipping company
was also broken into. At first it was thought that the target
had been the
firms computers. But, nothing was taken, it was assumed that
the burglars had
been scared off. Within thirty minutes
it was
discovered that
the company was
approaching its fiscal year end. staff eventually found that
most of the
recent database backup tape was missing.
A Quebec based
company with the
laser-based system for inspecting materials used in, among
other things, the
stealth aircraft, had three computers stolen.
On their
harddrives were
confidential codes for specialized software used by the
Canadian Armed
forces. The above are all true examples
of the modern
threat facing
international business today known as industrial or economic
espionage. The end of the cold and economic pressures
have increased the
risk of economic
espionage. The collapse of the Soviet
Union has left
unemployed KGB
and other former communist bloc intelligence agents
selling
everything from Russian night vision devices to completely assembled
and functional
bugging devices. Even friendly western European
governments have
been caught spying on private corporations based in the
U.S. and other
countries, while industrial competitors sometimes hire private
companies to
collect competitive intelligence from their corporate rivals(
Lester:96). What
exactly is economic espionage? how
prevalent is it? Who
does it? How do
they do it? and what can we do to stop it. These are the
questions that
will be looked at in the following
pages.
First lets look at, what exactly is economic
espionage. Espionage and
intelligence is
no longer the exclusive domain of monarchs and governments,
it has become a
must for modern international business.
Large corporations
around the world
particularly in western Europe and Asia now hire agents to
gather
intelligence on their competitors and other countries. The goal of
economic
espionage is to steal trade secrets, plans and confidential
procedures or
anything to give your company or country a competitive edge
over another
(Perry:1996). The areas that interest
industrial spies the most
include radiation
transfer technology, systems diagnostic
and testing
software,
traveling wave tubes, aviation
technologies, microwave
monolithic
integrated circuits, inferred signature
measures software, radar
technologies, wet
processing systems, information
management and
processing, simulation technologies, physical security
technologies, ram-jet
engine and
ram-jet technologies.(Special Security news letter:1995).
Although this is
not all of the areas that modern spies target, it will give you
an idea of the
scope of the problem. Peter Schweiser
author of the book
"Friendly
spies" speculates that for the most part, modern industrial spies are
motivated by pure
greed of money. If we look back in history we can see that
the majority of
the spies that were caught, were motivated by the money.
John walker head
of the notorious Walker spie ring, sold submarine secretes
to the Soviets
for 17 years for one million dollars.
Larry Wu-Tai Chin and
analyst of the CIA,
passed secrets to China and was paid $180,000 over a
three year
period. Richard Miller worked for the
FBI and was to be paid 2
million dollars
to pass counter-intelligence secrets to the Soviets, but he was
caught and was
only paid one quarter of this amount. It is easy to see that
spying for
friendly countries is a profitable business.
Is economic espionage really as bad as it is
made out to be? Since
1985 economic
espionage directed at American companies has increases 260
percent and the
FBI's industrial espionage caseload has jumped to well over
five hundred
investigations. Espionage is costing
American companies well
over a 100
billion dollars a year in lost sales infact some sources put the loss
at 260
billion. In Canada that Number
translates to 10 billion a year and
companies with
overseas operations are estimated to lose 140 billion dollars
per year. It is hard to get accurate numbers when it
come to losses due to
espionage for the
simple reason that companies don't want to admit to being
victims, in fear of
undermining the confidence of their suppliers and
shareholders
(Lester:1996). The visible damage of
economic espionage takes
the from of Lost contracts, jobs and markets, and overall
a diminished
competitive edge.
The companies that are hurt the most are
the ones that
earn under 11
million dollars annually.
How do industrial spies go about collecting
information. It is a well
known fact that
modern spies have used all of the collection methods used
during the cold
war for collecting information on industrial competitors.
Practitioners
of modern espionage seldom use one
method by itself, but
combine them into
concerted collection programs. countries
and corporations
have been known
to turn legitimate transactions or business relationships
stealthy
collection opportunities. Some of the methods of information
collection listed
below are most often used for legitimate purposes. Including
them here is not
to imply illegal activity, they are used to show as potential
elements of a
broader, coordinated intelligence effort(Security
Online:1996:5).
Classic
agent recruitment is an intelligence collectors best source. This
method provides a
trusted member inside a company or organization who the
collector cans
task to provide classified information.
An information
collector's
interest in recruiting personal is not limited to a high ranking
personal in a
company or organization. It is true that
researchers, key
business
managers, and corporate executives are a good target for industrial
spies, but
support personal such as secretaries, computer operators,
technicians, and
maintenance personal are also targeted.
The latter may
behave the best
access to competitive information, and their low pay may
provide good
ground for manipulation by intelligence agencies.(Security
On-line: issue 1)
Next spies use what is called us
volunteers. The people that have the
easiest access to
companies information is the companies own employees.
Employees who
steal information from their companies exhibit the same
motivations as
the typical spie or thief, illegal or excessive use of drugs or
alcohol, money
problems, personal stress, and just plain greed.
industrial spies will use ordinary surveillance
and simple break and
enter to gain
access to sensitive information.
Companies have reported break
and enters were
only laptops and disks were stolen when items of much more
value were close
by. Some countries pursuade hotel
operators to give their
spies access to
visitors rooms and luggage. during these
break-ins known as
"bag
ops" luggage is searched for sensitive information and any useful
documents are
copied or simply stolen.(Security On-line: issue 1)
Specialized technical operations constitutes
the largest part portion of
economic
espionage. This type of collection
includes computer intrusion,
telecommunications
targeting and intercept, and private-sector encryption
weaknesses. Corporate telecommunications especially
international
telecommunications
provide a highly vulnerable and lucrative source for
anyone interested
in obtaining trade secrets or competitive measures because
they are so
easily accessed and intercepted. Due to
the increased use these
links for
computer transmission and electronic amil, intelligence collectors
find
telecommunications interception cost-effective.
For example, foreign
intelligence
collectors intercept facsimile transmissions through
government-owned
telephone companies, and the stakes are large,
approximately
half of all overseas transmissions are facsimiles. innovative
hackers connected
to computers containing competitive information evade
the controls and
access companies information. In addition many American
companies have
begun using electronic data interchange, a system of
transferring
corporate bidding, invoice, and pricing data electronically
overseas. many
foreign government and corporate information collectors find
this information
invaluable.(Security On-line: issue 1)
Another tactic used in the world of corporate
espionage is economic
misinformation. Some governments use misinformation campaigns
to scare
their domestic
companies and potential clients away from dealing with US
companies. The press and governments agencies often
discuss foreign
economic and
industrial intelligence activities, often in vague non-specific
terms. The issue has been to paint foreign
competitors or countries as
aggressive and
untrustworthy, even if the accuser has no proof
of any
collection
activity. Some countries have widely
publicized their efforts to set
up information
security mechanisms to protect against their competitors
penetration
attempts, and frequently the United States id mentioned as the
primary
threat.(Security On-line: issue 1)
Tasking foreign students studying in the US and
other countries.
Some governments
task their students studying in a different country to
aquire
information on a variety of economic and technical subjects. In some
cases the
students are recruited before they start their studies, others are
approached after
and are recruited or pressured based on loyalty, fear for
their countries
government or intelligence service. In
some cases, at an
intelligence
collectors request, foreign graduate students serve as assistance at
no cost to
professors doing research in target areas.
These students then have
access to the
professors research and learns the applications of the
technology. As an alternative to compulsory military
service one government
has an organized
programs to send interns abroad, often with the specific
task of
collecting foreign business and technological information.(Security
On-line: issue
1)
As well
as recruiting students studying abroad, information collectors
will task foreign
employees of North American firms and
agencies. The
information
collector will recruit or task compatriot employee in A North
American firm to
steal information. Although similar to
the clandestine
recruitment used
by intelligence agencies, often no intelligence service is
involved, only a
competitive company or non-intelligence government
agency. The
collector then passes the information directly to a foreign firm or
the government
for the use in it research and development activities.(Security
On-line: issue 1)
Debriefing of foreign visitors to North
American countries is another
method collectors
use. Some countries actively debrief
their citizens after
travel in North
America, asking information acquired during their trips
abroad. Sometimes this debriefings are heavy handed,
with foreign scientists
describing them
as offensive. In some countries, they
are simply and
accepted part of
traveling abroad.(Security On-line: issue 1)
Recruitment of emigres, ethnic targeting is
another way information is
collected. Frequently, intelligence collectors find it
effective to target persons
of their own
ethic group. Persons working for the Us
military and research
and development
who have access to classified technology.
Several countries
have found
repatriation of emigre and foreign scientists to be the most
beneficial
technology transfer methodology. One
country, in particular,
claims to have
repatriated thousands of ethnic scientists back to their home
country from the
United States. Ethnic targeting includes
attempts to recruit
and task
naturalized US citizens and permanent resident aliens to assist in
acquiring secret
information. Frequently, foreign
intelligence collectors
appeal to a
persons patriotism and ethnic loyalty. Some countries collectors
resort to
threatening family members that continue to reside in their home
country.(Security
On-line: issue 1)
Information collectors will also use what is
refereed to as elicitation
during
international conferences and trade fairs.
Events such as international
conferences on
high-tech topics, trade fairs, and air shows-attract many
foreign
scientists and engineers, providing foreign intelligence collectors with
concentrated
group of specialists on a certain topic.
Collector target these
individuals while
they are abroad to gather any information the scientists or
engineers may
posses. Sometimes depending on the
country and the specific
circumstances
these elicitation efforts may be heavy handed.
Intelligence
collectors
sometimes try to recruit scientists by inviting them on all expense
paid trips abroad
for conferences or sabbaticals. The
individuals are treated
royally, and
their advice sought on areas of interest.
When they return to
their
country, collectors recontact them and
ask them to provide information
on their areas of
research. (Security On-line: issue 1)
Commercial data bases, trade and scientific journals, computer bulletin
boards, openly
available US government data, corporate publications are
another
source. Many collectors take advantage
of the vast amount of
competitive
information that is legally and openly available in the United
States. Open source information can provide
personality profile data, data on
new research and
development and planned products, new
manufacturing
technics, and
competitor strengths and weaknesses. Most collectors use this
information for
its own worth in their business competition.
However, some
use openly
available information as leads to refine and focus their clandestine
collection and to
identify individuals and organization that posses desired
information.(Security
On-line: issue 1)
Foreign
government use of private-sector organizations, front
companies, and
joint ventures is the next way collectors use to gather
intelligence. Some foreign governments exploit existing
non-government
affiliation
organizations or create new ones-such as friendship societies,
international
exchange organizations, import and export companies, and other
entities that
have frequent contact with foreigners to gather intelligence and
to place
intelligence collectors. They conceal
government involvement in
these
organizations and present them as merly private entities in order to
cover their
intelligence operations. These
organizations spot and assess
potential foreign
intelligence recruits with whom they have contact. Such
organizations
also lobby US government officials to chanfe policies the
foreign
governments consider unfavorable.(Security On-line: issue 1)
Corporate mergers and acquisitions. Several countries use corporate
mergers and
acquisitions to aquire technology. The
vast majority of these
transactions are
made for legitimate purposes. Sometimes
though they are
made to
specifically to allow a foreign company to aquire North American
technology
without spending their own resources on research and
development. According a 1994 US government document
entitled " Report
on US critical
technology Companies" 984 foreign mergers and acquisitions
of US critical
technology companies occurred between January 1st 1985 and
October 1st
1993. All but a handful of these mergers
and acquisitions were
friendly, and
four countries accounted for 68 percent of them. Of the total 60
percent of them
involved US companies involved in advanced materials,
computers
including software, peripherals, biotechnology, areas relative US
professional and
scientific instrumentation, communications equipment,
advanced
manufacturing, and aircraft and spare parts. (Security On-line:
issue 1)
The next way information is collected is
refered to as headhunting or
hiring
competitors employees. Foreign companies
typically hire
knowledgeable
employees of competing US firms to do corresponding work
for the foreign
firm. At times, they do this
specifically to gain inside
technical
information from the employee and use it against the competing US
firms.(Security
On-line: issue 1)
Corporate
technology agreements is another way information collectors
assemble
technological information. Some foreign
companies use potential
technology
sharing agreements as condiuts for receiving propriety
information. In such instances, foreign companies demand
that, in order to
negotiate an
agreement, the North American company must divulge large
amounts of
information about its processes and products, sometime much
more than is
justified by the project be negotiated.
Often the information
requested is
highly sensitive. In some of these
cases, the foreign company
either terminates
the deal after receipt of the information or refuses to
negotiate further
if denied the information.(Security On-line: issue 1)
Foreign companies will often use the favorable
research climate in
North
America. Foreign countries will sponsor
research activities at the
North American
university and research centers.
Generally everyone benefits
from the finished
research. At times, however, foreign
governments or
companies use the
opportunity as a one sided attempt only to collect research
results and
proprietary information at the North American facility. Foreign
intelligence
services also use these efforts to insert intelligence officers who
act solely as
information collectors. (Security On-line: issue 1)
Hiring information brokers, consultants.
Information brokers scour the
world for
valuable information. What they can not
obtain legally or by guile
some information
brokers will purchase. The broker then
verifies the data,
puts it into a
usable and easily accessible format, and delivers it to interested
clients. The following example, that was printed in
the Asian Wall Street
Journal in 1991
and illustrates this type of activity.
The ad was followed by a
phone number in
western Europe.
" Do you have advanced/privileged
information on any type of
project/contract that is going to be carried
out in your country?
We hold commission/agency agreements with many
large
European companies and could introduce them
to "your"
project/contract. Any commission received would be shared with
yourselves."
Some
countries frequently hire well connected consultants to write
reports on topics
of interest and to lobby North American government
officials on the
countries behalf. Often, the consultants are often high ranking
US government
officials who maintain contacts with their former colleagues.
They exploit
these connections and contract relationships to acquire protected
information and
gain access to other high level officials who are currently
holding positions
of authority through whom they attempt to further aquire
protected
information.(Security On-line: issue 1)
Fulfillment of classified US government
contracts and exploitation of
department of
defense sponsored technology sharing agreements. At times,
classified
government contracts are awarded to companies that are partially or
substantially
controlled by foreign governments.
Although the US
governments
security agencies closely monitor these contracts, they still
provide foreign
governments with unauthorized access to information.
Traditional
allies of the US are most likely to use this method, since
non-allies seldom
are included in such contracts.(Security On-line: issue 1)
The last method of information collection we
will look at tasking
liaison officers
at government to government projects.
During joint research
and development
activities, foreign governments routinely request to have
on-site liaison
officers to monitor progress and provide guidance. Several
allied countries
have taken advantage of these positions as cover for
intelligence
officers assigned with collecting as much information about the
facility as
possible. Using their close access to
their US counterparts
conducting joint research and development, particularly
in the defense arena,
liaison officers
have been caught removing documents clearly marked as
restricted or
classified. (Security On-line: issue 1)
Now that we have looked at how foreign countries
and companies go
about collecting
information from North American companies.
The FBI
investigations
reflect that 23 countries are currently engaged in espionage
against North
American countries. France is one of the
countries that we will
look at.
The French currently commit 200 full-time
agents world wide. These
agents are known
as the " General de la Securite Exterieure" and concentrate
on the soft
business targets. The other full-time
group in the French
intelligence
service is the "Service 7". This group of spies is also known as
the action
unit. They carry out all of the
operations that require a deft
hand,IE
break-ins, buggings and covert operations.
These full-time agents
are only part of
the story, France also has part-time information collectors
called
"Honorary correspondents".
This group of people includes a large
number of
corporate officials living overseas.
Some of these people work for
money, but others
see it as part of their jobs. An example
of this type of
information
collectors a man by the name of Pierre Marion.
Pierre was a Air
France
representative who lived in Japan. His
job was to collect information
about Japanese
social circles particularly as it related to Japanese political
officials.
For its size no other country in the world has
the intelligence capability
of South
Korea. The Korean intelligence service
is called the "National
Security Planning
Agency" and is active around the world providing a variety
of intelligence
and espionage services to Korean interests. South Korean
agents operate in
North Korea, China and the Soviet Union, but the United
States and Japan
is were they are most active. US
intelligence sources have
bee heard to say
that the NSP is more effective than Israelis Mossad. The
NSP has a
technically proficient agents, enormous financial resources, and a
well-organized
group of informers. An example of an
operation the South
Koreans carry out
is called " Operation Laughing Bird".
This operation was
conducted in
Japan and was designed to gather technological information to
support South
Korean industry. It was put into action
in 1981. It included
more than 200
agent. These agents engaged in
electronic eavesdropping, the
planting of moles
and agents, the use of organized crime syndicates in Japan
and the
recruitment of Japanese and American workers to act as agents.
Israel is the next country that we will look
at. The Israeli economic
espionage
collection agency is called the " LAKAM", and is one of Israel's
most effective
intelligence organizations> LAKAM is an Hebrew acronym
for Israeli
Defense Minuister's Scientific Liaison Bureau.
Its agents operate
in United States,
Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Switzerland,
and Sweden. LAKAM's biggest operation is in the US. Their agents operate
out of the
Israeli ambassy in Washington as well as
two other shops, in Los
Angeles and the
other in New York. Theri operations in
these cities are
believed to
include thirty five full-time agents with a several dozen informers.
companies that
benefit the most in Israel include aerospace, chemical
producers, and
electronics firms. In addition to
regular agents the Israelis use
dee cover agents
posing as business people and scientists traveling to the
United
States. Most of the time the agents are
in direct contact with the
Prime Minister
through the telephone and telex, but if it is something that is
extremely
sensitive diplomatic pouches are used to transport it.
Next lets turn our attention toward
Germany. Germany's intelligence
service is called
the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). Since
the 1960's the
Germans have been
actively involved in spying on the US, France, Great
Britain, and
Italy. The BND regularly monitor
telecommunications of
foreign
corporations bases in Germany. he BND is
very active in the US.
German agents
have cultivated mole or spies in Us high-tech firms. The
BND is gathering
extensive information in the fields of economy, technology
and
industry.
These United States is not completely innocent
in the world of
espionage. Now that the cold war is over the CIA
officials have latched onto
the idea of
collecting economic data to justify the inflated budget of the
agency. Dozens of US corporations from fortune 500
companies to small,
high tech firms,
are secretly assisting the CIA, allowing the agency to place
full-time
officers from its operations division into corporate offices abroad.
Serving under
what is refereed as "nonofficial cover" (NOC), CIA officers
pose as American
businessmen in friendly countries, from Asia to Central
America to
Western Europe. Once there, they recruit
agents from the ranks
of foreign
officials and business leaders, pilfer secrets, and even conduct
speacial
operations and parliamentary activity
(Dreyfus:95:1). Proof that the
United States is
engaged in this type of espionage
happened in 1995 when
the French
government demanded that four business officials leave the
country because
they were allegedly caught gathering French economic and
political
secrets. Three businessmen were posing as American diplomats and
the fourth was
operating under a business cover( Time: March 6:1995).
As stated above Espionage is not the exclusive
domain of governments
anymore. Some
corporations have intelligence organizations that rival that of
a small
country. other companies that do not
have intelligence organization
of their own
retain or hire private investigators when espionage is required.
An example of the
use of company spies happened in July 1989. A du pont
chemical plant
was the site of an well planned espionage scheme. Visitors
from a German
chemical company were visiting the plant.
One of the
visitors, while
looking over a table accidentally dip the tip of his tie into a vat
of
chemicals. Company officials at first
were very apologetic and offered to
replace the
tie. The visitor insisted o keeping the
tie because it was from his
family. Only
after an experienced company security official protested to
company leaders
that the accident was probably a scheme to obtain a
chemical sample
did the company insist on keeping the
tie(Scheizer:1993:253).
Lastly we will look at some of the ways that
companies can protect
themselves
against economic espionage. The following was taken from a
paper written by
Kevin d. Murray A certified protection professional called
"10
Spy-Busting Secrets".
According to Murray, espionage is preventable if you know the
vulnerabilities,
you can take the proper precautions.
Murray presents a list of
the top ten ways
to fight back against economic espionage.
The first thing Murray examines is what is
called trash trawling. this is
simply digging
through garbage. This activity is
legal. The simple
counter-espionage
tactic for this is to reduce that availability of what he
refers to as
puzzle parts. companies must encourage
destruction of waste
paper by
purchasing shredders appropriate to the needs of the company, Use
crosscut
destruction for high level security,
computer paperwork and large
volume waste
require a central bulk shredder. do not
leave confidential
papers in a box
under desks for later shredding shred it now,
Do not entrust
wastepaper
destruction to paper recycling vendors destroy it before recycling.
The big shredder
purchasing mistake is buying just one shredder for everyone
to use. Some people are to busy to be bothered. Murray recommends the
use of several
convenient desk-side shredders.
Bugs and wire tapping is the next area examined
by Murray.
Electronic spying
is the most devastating spy trick there is.
A common
mistake is
saying"Oh I'm just being paranoid" when you suspect electronic
surveillance. Murray recommends not discussing your
suspicions with others
unless they have
a real need to know, do not discuss your
suspicions in the
suspect
areas, don't attempt a do-it yourself
solution, don't waste money
buying spybuster
toys, seek professional guidance without delay.
Contrary to
what is seen on
television and in catalogs, detection of bugs and wiretaps is
equipment and
knowledge intensive work. Expect a
professional sweep team
to have about
$100,000 dollars invested in their equipment as well as an
extensive
background in security, investigations, telecommunications and
electronics.
These types of professionals will not be
found in the yellow
pages, you must
contact a corporate security professional for a
recommendation.
The drop by spies is the next area of
interest. Check and photocopy
credentials and
work orders of anyone performing technical work in or
around your
offices. Verify the work was actually
requested and most of all
necessary. This included telecommunications technicians,
office equipment
repair persons,
paper recycles, cleaning crews, electricians etc. Have
someone that
represents the interests of your company accompany these
individuals while
on your property. Outsider contractors
and unauthorized
company employees
should never br allowed to roam free unescorted. One
professional
snoop brags openly that any building can be entered at any ti
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