On June 28th,
1948 the Cominform, the principle symbol of Stalin’s control over Eastern
Europe, issued a resolution that formally expelled Yugoslavia from the
assembly, citing that Yugoslavia’s ruler, Josep Broz-Tito, had deviated from
the correct communist line of governance.
Stalin contended that Tito was guilty of flouting the “unified communist
front against imperialism”[1]
and he also accused Tito of taking the road to nationalism.[2] According to Marxist-doctrine, Yugoslavia’s
break from the Soviet Union and the Communist world at large defied the
“impossible.” The split pronounced the
fact that the dogmatic faith of Marxist-Leninism failed to acknowledge that
different values inherent within state leaders cannot be simply reduced to a
single common denominator advertently leading to a cohesive line of
governance. It is therefore unnecessary
to discern whether Stalin or Tito was a Marxist
heretic, for it is apparent
that the true essence of Marxist-Leninism doctrine is contentious. It is
necessary, however, to understand why the Soviet Union branded Yugoslavia as a
threatening reactionary, renegade, and nationalist force. For within the context of these three central
notions it is possible to demystify the unthinkable split between the two
communist powers and the consequences of the split within Yugoslavia in the
immediate years that followed. In short,
Tito’s apparent deviance from Communist theory, as interpreted by the USSR,
underscored the tensions that existed within socialist doctrine regarding the
path of its implementation.[3] Ultimately, the realities of power in the
political and social life of Russia and Yugoslavia revealed the fundamental
tensions in communist doctrine and practice that led to the split between the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Acting
as General and Marshal of the Yugoslavian partisan movement during the war
period, Josep Broz-Tito managed to successfully liberate the Slavic peoples
from Nazi rule. The Soviets and the
Yugoslavian guerilla fighters shared the same anti-fascist sentiments towards
the Germans and the same skepticism towards the wartime Yugoslavian government
in exile.[4] Tito’s Marxist beliefs cemented a relatively
strong relationship with Stalin. Despite
certain disputes and misunderstandings, the two leaders supported each other
both directly and indirectly during the war.
Thus, between the period of 1945-48 it appeared to the outer world that
Tito was one of Stalin’s staunchest allies.
Shortly after the conclusion of the war, however, Tito began to follow policies
which were independent from Moscow’s in order to consolidate his power within
the Balkans. Initially, after the end of
World War II Tito had modeled Yugoslavia’s constitution after the Soviet
Union’s. The constitution encouraged
direct control over all state activities by the Communist party, as well as the
subjugation of a federal system of government in favor of a strong central
order. Tito was quick to realize,
however, that Yugoslavia’s ethnic and nationalist diversity would threaten the
stability and efficiency of a purely central system of government. Tito understood that in order to maintain
control over the Balkans he had to amalgamate and consolidate the regions that
made up Yugoslavia with the hope of holding the regions together under one
distinct, sovereign nation. Refusing to
allow Yugoslavia to become docile to Soviet dominance, Tito began to liberalize
his interpretation of Marxist-Leninism and encouraged the formation of a
communist federation of constituent republics made up of political entities
that existed within Yugoslavia. These
republics were controlled by Tito’s dictatorial powers. In short, Tito favored a federal system of
communist government.
Tito was able to
maintain a firm grip over his country through his strong police force and his
tight political grip over the Yugoslavian Communist party. He was hostile towards Moscow’s foreign
policy that dominated the national, political, and economical agendas of its
eastern satellite states. Tito contended
that internal “power, rationality, and national interest held primacy”[5],
over aligning Yugoslavian communism directly with the Soviet Union. Stalin felt extremely threatened by Tito’s
failure to submit to Soviet rule and Soviet doctrine as prescribed by Stain
himself. Stalin realized that his
control over the Eastern-Communist states and Russia herself relied heavily, if
not totally, on the suppression of nationalist sentiments. There was no room for an equal federation of
nationalities within Stalin’s Soviet Union.
Historically,
Stalin had always dictated Soviet foreign policy in a manner that placed Russia
on a Communist pedestal. Stalinist
national communism “went to great lengths in its chauvinistic fixation on great
Russian originality and priority.”[6] In light of this statement, the fact that
Stalin vigorously refuted any nationalist sentiment amongst the territories of
Eastern Europe that the Russians had “liberated” during the war appears to be
contradictory, or at the very least problematic. Nevertheless, one may legitimately contend
that this hypocrisy was the essence of Stalinist rule. Stalin understood Russia to be the father of
communism; he believed that Russia was destined to provide the proper base that
would see communism flourish as a worldwide government destroying the evil
capitalist and bourgeois states.
Consequently, Stalin did not tolerate anyone who wished to deviate from
the line of communism prescribed by Russia.
Yugoslavia’s failure to submit to Moscow’s policies ensured its
expulsion from the Cominform.
The
spirit of Yugoslavian nationalism threatened to encourage nationalism
throughout the whole communist empire.
While Tito expected to be treated as an “equal” Stalin refused to offer
such equality to any Communist states.
Stalin had hoped that by expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominterm Tito
would be forced out of power by his fellow Slavs. Stalin, however, had underestimated Tito’s
power within Yugoslavia. By the time of
his expulsion, Tito had already managed to build Yugoslavia into an effective
military entity, with a very strong and ruthless secret police. Tito’s police force was, unlike other Eastern
Communist states, not dominated by Moscow but controlled by Belgrade. During the war and the several years that
followed Tito had managed to purge most, if not all, dissident elements within
the Communist party and Yugoslavia itself.
Yugoslavia, in the post war period, had also managed to maintain its own
foreign policy. Tito’s independent
victory over the Nazis and the failure of Stalin to send troops into Yugoslavia
during the latter stages of the war helped Tito to consolidate his power. Tito began to flex a political line that was
distinct and separate from Stalin’s political doctrine.
One of the most
pronounced consequences of the Cominform’s decision to expel Yugoslavia from
its assembly resulted in the re-alignment of Yugoslavia’s Marxist-Leninist
values. Without the massive external
support the Soviet Union had once offered, Tito was forced to refocus his
domestic policies by restructuring his internal political support. Tito also had to re-negotiate Yugoslavia’s
foreign policy in a manner that would gain him internal support from
Yugoslavia’s constituent republics and bolster his legitimacy as Yugoslavia’s
undisputed national leader. The ultimate
result of Tito’s expulsion was an extremely successful foreign policy that is
best summarized by the word “nonalignment.”[7]
After June 28th 1948, Yugoslavia became a non-aligned country. Tito’s policy of nonalignment must be judged
as a colossal triumph. From the
viewpoint of a nation made up of a variety of ethnic and national groups,
Tito’s decision that Yugoslavia follow a foreign policy primarily based on
nonalignment was a domestically and internationally beneficial decision, “it
gave the Yugoslav state and Tito immense international stature… it appealed to
a broad coalition of groups within Yugoslavia. Indeed it [was] probably… ‘The
only foreign policy acceptable to all factions of the [communist party], to the
different republics within the Yugoslav federation and the main strata of the
population.’”[8] Yugoslavia’s policy of nonalignment in the
years following 1948 lead it towards political ties with third world nations
(often socialist in nature), as well as linkages to developed Western
economies.
The impact of the
rift between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in a variety of
occurrences and events in the immediate years following 1948. One of the first, and perhaps most
significant consequences of the split, was that Tito’s defying attitude towards
Stalin proved to be a major personal blow for the Russian leader and Russia at
large. It was the first serious external
challenge that the supreme ruler of the Soviet Union had ever faced, until 1948
Stalin has been considered to be the undisputed leader of world communism.[9] One might also legitimately argue that
Stalin’s failure to eliminate the threat of Tito and the cult of Titoism,
referring to Tito’s reactionary policies as interpreted by Stalin, might have
incidentally contributed, “to the downfall of Stalinism as a creed and a model
not only in the USSR, but, above all, in the smallest East European
countries…hence, Tito’s physical survival proved to be a key element in the
contest between him and successive Soviet leaders.”[10] Kremlin officials feared that Tito’s renegade
nature would enhance the chances of revolts in both Hungary and Poland. These two countries had significant portions
of their populations who were inspired and encouraged by Tito’s style of governance. In essence, Tito managed to set up a
communist blueprint for action for Easter European countries who wished to
reassert their political control and recover power from their Soviet
counterparts.
Throughout the
crisis of 1948 until Stalin’s death in 1953, Moscow continuously implemented a
hostile diplomatic stance towards Tito and Yugoslavia with the hope of
conveying to the Communist world, more specifically to the Eastern European
communist states, that only through complete subordination to Moscow’s rule and
advice could political power be maintained and socio-economic success
achieved. Communist countries throughout
Europe were encouraged to rely exclusively on the Soviet Union and strongly
discouraged to follow independent revolutionary action. In short, “it was not a matter of [simply]
humiliating [the Yugoslavian Communist Party] that had fallen into disgrace,
but the far graver matter of securing the monopoly of a leadership in the
Communist world movement, the monopoly which Tito was endangering.”[11] Tito was lucky that his challenge towards
Stalin’s rule on ideological grounds did not lead him to a similar fate shared
by both Trotsky and Bukharin. The issue
of national sovereignty was the only ground on which Tito believed that he
could legitimately, while still maintaining support within the Balkans, resist
Stalin.[12] By disregarding Soviet policy and embarking
on a separate program of foreign policy without the support of Stalin, Tito
broke a common unspoken rule of the Soviet Union’s alignment structure, which
proclaimed, “that a free hand in domestic affairs depended on an acceptance of
Stalin’s pre-eminence in international affairs.”[13] Although the reasons as to why Tito believed
that he could implement and export a far-reaching ideological change in
communist polices throughout Europe are unclear, the consequences of his action
were severe. Tito’s expulsion from the
Cominform signaled the beginning of Stalin’s campaign to smash ‘Titoism’, and “whip
the communist parties of Eastern Europe into line and establish there a series
of identical dictatorships,”[14]
dictatorships that Stalin could control, manipulate, and exploit in order to
maintain Moscow’s firm grip over the communist bloc.
At the end of the day,
Stalin’s hope that Tito could be disgraced and ruined by propaganda and
economic pressure failed. The temptation
to get rid of him, however, still existed.[15] Barring economic trade and amassing Soviet
troops on Yugoslavia’s border did little but strengthen Tito’s resolute
stance. It was during this stand off,
that Yugoslavia realized they faced the world alone and without any
friends. Therefore Tito began to follow
a path of reconciliation with the Western Powers. Beginning in 1951, he started to accept
western economic aid and negotiated loans and trade agreements with Britain,
France, and the United States.
Yugoslavia’s bettering of relations with the West won her a seat on the
United Nations Security Council. This
honor added more stature and legitimacy to Tito’s Yugoslavia. Tito defended Yugoslavia’s “acceptance of
Western aid – including military aid – as being necessary not only to keep
Yugoslavia independent, but also as important for world defense against Soviet
aggression.”[16] In reality, Yugoslavia’s reorientation towards
new successful internal socialist policies may have never taken place had
Western aid not been given.[17] 1949 proved to be a watershed year in
Yugoslavian – Western relations. What
followed from Tito’s conciliation with the capitalist West was several years of
mutual hostility between the Soviet and Yugoslav relations. Envisioning the Soviet Union as an enemy
state, Tito looked in the direction of the West for economic assistance. Tito expertly negotiated relations with
Western powers without compromising Yugoslavian internal affairs.[18] The Belgrade government, “was faced with an
apparently insoluble problem: how to have its army equipped by a foreign power,
free of charge, without conceding any bases, without even admitting a military
mission to the country, and without brining itself to that Power by a treaty…
the feat must [have] been unique to world history… it was reckless audacity to
try it, and incredible that is succeeded.”[19]
This accomplishment was the key to Tito’s successful implementation of his
foreign policy of non-alignment .
It has been
historically established that the initial split occurred over nationalist
considerations and doctrinal differences.[20] It is interesting to note that Yugoslavia’s
immediate reaction to their expulsion from the Cominform was to radicalize, and
not liberalize, their Marxist policies.
Tito and his communist cadres wanted to prove to the communist world at
large that they were staunch Marxist Leninists and that any proposition to the
contrary was false.[21] Gradually, however, Tito began to relax his
radical programs of nationalization and collectivization of Yugoslavia’s
industrial and agrarian sectors. Tito
realized that Yugoslavia could not bear the full brunt of the Soviet economic
embargo that had followed the Cominform’s decision in 1948. Thus, Tito began to implement socio-economic
programs distinct from the Soviet Union.
A new constitution that recognized Yugoslavia’s national diversity was
just the beginning of sweeping political and economical reforms. After leaving the Cominform and the benefits
of its membership, Tito realized that many of his party’s’ repressive measures,
both politically and economically, were counter-productive and anachronistic. Mass collectivization of agriculture began to
subside while decentralization and wider self-government followed. The government also, “relaxed its anti-church
measures, permitted a degree of public criticism, limited the abuses of party
officials’ privileges, and took the first step towards curving the absolute
powers of the secret police by introduction a new criminal code.”[22] None of these measures could have been
carried out if Yugoslavia had remained in the politically restrictive and
domineering coalition of the Cominform.
Marxism was the ideological framework in which Tito’s polices were
legitimized.
Thus, it is apparent that after the split with the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia began to develop its own type of Communist society. Disagreement arose among Yugoslav Communist
leaders, since some sided with the Soviet Union in the 1948 split. These dissident elements were purged from
the government and imprisoned. After
Tito had allowed the republics and provinces to receive greater control over
local matters, a system of self-management in the working sector of society
commenced in 1950. In basic terms, this system of self-management decentralized
government planning in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The central committee turned over economic
responsibility to the communes and workers councils. The central authorities only outlined general
economic polices rather than forcefully imposing a status quo upon all
localities. This system could be
interpreted as a combination of capitalist and socialist ideals. Tito, on the other hand, considered this
policy to be pragmatic Marxism. The
success of Yugoslavia’s economic reforms reinforced the legitimacy of Tito’s
political program. His successes
depended on his ability to be pragmatic and willing to adapt to different
circumstances and popular demand, “the Yugoslav’s people’s desire for more
personal and political freedom, more regional autonomy for the constituent
Republics, and more scope for Private owner-ship and economic enterprise had to
be taken into account and harnessed for social and national ends.”[23] To Tito, Marxism
was not dogma, but a guide to action. In
this context, Marxism was a framework that had to be adjusted and tweaked
according to specific circumstances and local necessities.
After Stalin’s death in 1953 tension between Tito and
the Soviet Union became a bit more relaxed.
In 1955 Khrushchev took the initiative and traveled to Belgrade to mend
the relationship between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Tito still maintained his policy of
non-alignment and continued to be the leading speaker for the uncommitted
nations of the world. Furthermore, he
refused to take sides on Cold War issues.
Tito’s death in 1980 was considered by some to be a relief and by others
to be a tragedy. There is not too much
room to debate the fact that Tito successfully managed to consolidate the
regions of Yugoslavia under one legitimate totalitarian government. Compared with the status of other Eastern
states suppressed by Soviet rule, Yugoslavia faired extremely well both
socially and economically. Although
aspects of Tito’s rule were quite brutal, he managed to transform the
assumption that the Balkans was a region of confusion lacking proper
leadership. The split that occurred in
1948 due to Yugoslavia’s reactionary and nationalistic interpretation of
Marxism allowed Tito to implement liberal reforms that would not have been
possible while maintaining their membership in the Cominform. Tito’s flexible
and pragmatic nature allowed him to stay in power, survive the Soviet threat,
and resist Western dominance until his death in 1980. He was a key pillar in maintaining
Yugoslavian unity and economical progress.
Works
Cited
1)
Armstrong, Hamilton, Tito and Goliath, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955)
2)
Auty, Phyllis , “Yugoslavia and the Cominform:
Realignment of Foreign Policy,” in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of
War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1982)
3)
Bass and Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record,
(New York: Prospect Books, 1959)
4)
Clissold, Stephan ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union 1939-1973, (London: Oxford University Pres, 1975)
5)
Farrell, R. Barry
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union
1948-1956, (Yale: Shoe String Press, 1956)
6)
Halperin, Ernst, The Triumphant Heretic: Tito’s
Struggle Against Stalin, (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1958)
7)
Korbonski, Andrzej, “The Impact of the
Soviet-Yugoslav Rift on World Communism,” in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the
Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982)
8)
Swain, Geoffrey, “The Cominform: Tito’s
International” in The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (GB: Cambridge
University Press, Sep., 1992) p. 642
9)
Zimmerman,
William, “Yugoslav Strategies of Survival 1948-1980,” in Wayne S. Vucinich,
ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic
Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982)
The Pragmatic
Marxist:
An analysis of
the 1948 Tito-Stalin Dispute
Lawrence Schouten
78898012
History 463
Dr. David J Gossen
[1] Hamilton Armstrong, Tito and
Goliath, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955) p. XI
[2] Ibid., p. XI
[3] Bass and Marbury, The
Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record, (New York:
Prospect Books, 1959) p. XII
[4] Stephen Clissold ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973,
(London: Oxford University Pres, 1975) p. 20
[5] R. Barry Farrell, Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union 1948-1956, (Yale: Shoe String Press, 1956) p. 1
[6] Bass and Marbury, The
Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58, p. XVI
[7] William Zimmerman, “Yugoslav Strategies of Survival 1948-1980,” in
Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split
in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p.
26
[8] Ibid. p. 26
[9] Andrzej Korbonski, “The Impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rift on World
Communism,” in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The
Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982), p. 2
[10] Ibid. p. 2
[11] Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic: Tito’s Struggle Against
Stalin, (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1958), p. 67
[12] Geoffrey Swain, “The Cominform: Tito’s International” in The
Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (GB: Cambridge University Press, Sep.,
1992) p. 642
[13] Ibid., p. 652
[14] Ibid., p. 663
[15] Armstrong, Tito and Goliath,
p. 3
[16] Phyllis Auty, “Yugoslavia and the Cominform: Realignment of Foreign
Policy,” in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace p.
68
[17] Ibid., p. 68
[18] Farrell, Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, p. 3
[19] Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic, p. 147
[20] Armstrong, Tito and Goliath,
p. 2
[21] Stephen Glissold ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973,
p. 61
[22] Ibid., p. 61
[23] Stephen Glissold ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973,
p. 62
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