The question of the mind-body problem often challenges the balance
of science and philosophy in our most mysterious and yet central aspects, our
own minds. This essay will explore these
very issues and examine whether Thomas Nagel’s objections to the reduction
theory are valid, and how if at all his explanation answers the mind-body
problem.
It has been argued that the mind and the brain are correlated in
such a way that the experiences of the mind are a result of activities within
the physical brain. This implies that
without a brain or working physical body, the mind would not exist. This argument can be furthered to state that
the experiences of the mind can be reduced to mental processes.[1] This is the basic argument of “reductionism”
which Thomas Nagel objects to in his article What Is It Like to Be a Bat? He breaks the mind down into two categories;
the subjective and objective.[2] The subjective mind is connected to our
consciousness, and inner processes, which he describes as what it feels like to
be a certain organism. The objective
mind which can be externally experienced or understood includes the
physiological structure of the brain. Thomas
Nagel examines the mind and brain of a Bat to argue that the reduction theory
can not be true. He states that although
we as humans can understand the intricate physical details of a Bat’s brain we
can not know what it would feel like to experience a physical environment the
way they do. Through our own scientific
discovery we know that Bats do not have visual perception. They send sound waves out into their
atmosphere bay making a high pitched squeeking sound by sensing how the bounce
back to them they determine distance, size, shape and movement. We can easily understand this concept however
it is hardly within the human realm of imagination to understand how it must feel to experience the world through the
perception of a Bat.[3] Thomas Nagel reverses this example to argue
that no amount of scientific evidence about our own perception can shed light
onto the feeling of experiencing the
world through a human mind.
“This bears directly on the mind-body
problem. For if the facts of experience
– facts about what it feels like for the experiencing organism – are accessible
only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of
experience could be reveled in the physical condition of the organism.”[4]
Thomas Nagel does not make an argument for the dualist or the
physicalist. He merely argues that as it
stands the physicalist perspective can not be true due to a limited viewpoint. Because he does not take a strong position it
is difficult to develop an opposing one.
I agree with Nagel’s perspective that the mind can not be reduced to the
purely physical level. I feel that it
would not be possible to ignore the “subjective mind” because I have an aspect
to myself which reacts based on what I feel at an emotional, not physical
level. This aspect of me is what sets me
apart from all others with the same basic physiological systems. In contrast the idea that a spiritual aspect
of me could be sustained without the physical one is also equally
improbable. I agree with the arguments
presented by Thomas Nagel.
In conclusion, the arguments presented in Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It
Like to Be a Bat?” are valid, and disprove the possibility of reducing the mind
to a purely physical level it does not answer the mind-body question, or
present us with even another possibility for its solution.
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