Despite
widespread diplomatic discussion, and sentiment that the UN Security Council
must be
expanded in order
to maintain its long-term legitimacy, no generally acceptable formula for
expansion has
emerged. Concerns for obtaining or retaining voting power, and for preserving a
body structured
so as to be able to take prompt and effective decisions, have prevented
agreement.
This article
reviews various criteria for evaluating restructuring proposals, and suggests a
formula
that, while not
fundamentally affecting the distribution of power on the Council, might satisfy
many
states' minimal
requirements for an acceptable package of changes.
Norwegian
Security Policy after the Cold
War
The end of the
Cold War between East and West has strengthened Norwegian security,
which makes
Norway no different from most other European countries. There are now
more dimensions
to security policy than there were when the overriding aim was
deterrence by
means of one's own and allied military forces. Cold War perceptions of
military threat
no longer exist. In Norway's particular case, however, it is possible to talk
about a remaining
strategic threat, when referring to Russian deployments in the far north.
Such a threat is
only a potential one and is not imminent today. Yet it has to be
acknowledged that
wars between nations and ethnic groups have hardly been abolished.
As a result, it
has become more difficult to identify the risk of armed aggression directed
against Norway
The risk would
seem to reside in the escalation of a whole series of completely different
political
developments. For
example, these eventualities could take the form of the emergence of a
nationalistic
dictatorship, or the development of ungovernable political chaos in formerly communist
countries.
Because of the existence of some very large arsenals and supplies of military
equipment, it
is important to
judge the political aims of potential opponents. These can change over time,
not least
if they represent
irrational and aggressive attitudes. The nuclear weapons of the great powers do
not
seem to have any
deterrent effect on "violent ethnic cleansing", and the emergence of
armed conflicts
in different
areas can be difficult to predict.
But a country's
security can also be subject to something that has become more topical after
the
Cold War: low
level threats. These are related to some very different types of irregular
national
border
transgressions, for example international crime and various forms of pollution.
The Cold War's
dominating concept, security by means of deterrence, is complemented by the
concept of
collective security. This harmonises well with the traditional Norwegian
approach to
security policy
of combining deterrence with reassurance. The potential enemy is also a
partner. A
small country has
no less a need for allies, but for different purposes.
Following the
result of the Norwegian referendum in the autumn of 1994, which rejected EU
membership, the
current status of Norwegian security policy can be summarised as follows:
* We are a member
of NATO
* an associated
member of the WEU, and
* our Nordic
neighbours are members of the EU.
Foundations
For most of the
period following the Second World War, Norway sought national security through
membership of
NATO. Up until 1940 the key word was neutrality, a neutrality that was well
disposed towards
the British. During the Second World War Norway was occupied, whilst the legal
government sought
exile in London. Norway took part in an "overseas front" on the side
of the
Allies. An
important Norwegian contribution to the war effort was the achievement of its
large
merchant fleet.
Strategic value
A basic premise
of Norwegian security policy is the perception of the assumed military and
strategic
value of
Norwegian territory for the combatants in a great power conflict. The absence
of any
political
conflict with Norway is the precondition for such an offensive. War between the
Nordic
countries is now
looked upon as totally unimaginable and is therefore excluded from all
practical
planning. The
Nordic countries together make up a "security community".
Norway was not
involved in the First World War because it was mainly limited to the European
continent. It was
a land war during which Norway was protected by the British fleet at the same
time as the
German fleet was mainly held to its own naval bases.
Norway was drawn
into the Second World War as the result of a strategic German invasion
undertaken as
part of its war against England. This war was fought on a much wider geographic
scale and also
developed into a war at sea. Norway, with its long coastline, became a theatre
of
war. Furthermore,
Norwegian territory was used as one of several launching points for Germany's
war against the
Soviet Union. It was the Soviet Union which later liberated parts of Eastern
Finnmark from the
retreating German forces.
During the Cold
War the military value of Norwegian territory increased. The reason for this
was the
build-up of large
sea, air, and to a lesser extent, land-based military capacity in the Soviet
North-West.
Norway was regarded as the place where NATO could lose a Third World War
should the Soviet
Union freely be able to use Norwegian ports and airfields as part of the
struggle to
gain military
control over the Atlantic.
Not alone
Another
fundamental premise of Norwegian security policy is the perception that Norway,
by
herself, will
never be able to effectively repel a great power attack or prevent a serious
great power
attempt to occupy
the country.
In need of
assistance
Consequently, the
third fundamental premise of Norwegian security policy is that the country is
in
need of military
assistance from countries interested in preventing an occupation of Norway.
Since
1949 Norway
secured such assistance by means of her membership in NATO. The Second World
War demonstrated
that Allied help has to be agreed upon and preparations for it made in
peacetime, if it
is to be effective. The NATO alliance has fulfilled this need.
But even during
the Cold War, Norwegian security was not assumed to be so vulnerable as to
necessitate the
deployment of foreign, allied troops on Norwegian territory. The political and
military
cooperation in
NATO was assumed to form an adequate basis for deterring any peacetime attack.
It also provided
the basis for Norwegian base policy which was formulated in response to a
Soviet
approach before
Norway became a NATO member. The government decided that Norway should
not open bases
for the armed forces of foreign countries unless the country was under attack
or
under threat of
attack. For Norway, it became an important diplomatic instrument to be able to
warn that, should
there occur Soviet diplomatic or military coercion which might be interpreted
as a
threat or an
attack, the Government could retaliate by enlisting the allied armed forces.
Norwegian
security policy became a tightrope-walk between deterrence and reassurance.
Deterrence was to
make it clear that it would be too dangerous to attack Norway, because the
military power of
the alliance could be deployed against Soviet territory. Reassurance might
serve to
show the Soviet
Union that Norwegian policy stood firm as long as the country was not provoked.
In this way
Norway has been able to conduct a stable and effective low-tension policy based
on
predictability.
The threat is
removed
The end of the
Cold War has also removed the threat of a Third World War. It has altered the
perception of
threat for all countries. On this point Norway is no exception. Furthermore, it
is official
Norwegian policy
to state that the country is not exposed to any threat of military attack.
Norwegian
authorities do talk, however, of a transition from strategic to political risk.
It is said that
one is faced with
a dilemma where the most dangerous risks are regarded as the most unlikely -
but
where those which
affect Norway more indirectly, carry a much greater degree of probability.
Behavioural norms
Norwegian
security is dependent on international peace, stability and security. Because
of modern
communications,
geographic distance no longer affords protection. A first line of defence
consists of
all actors in the
international arena - whether states or organisations - respecting those norms
of
political
behaviour which promote peace and toleration. But as the security policy
challenge is also
inherent in
domestic political developments, it is important that political chaos and
conflict do not
emerge. An
important perception, which Norwegian authorities share, is that democratic
progress in
states which
earlier were non-democratic is conducive to peace and stability. The
preconditions for
democracy are the
sharing of power and a certain degree of economic privatisation. The conflicts
in
the former Soviet
Union and the former Yugoslavia, which demonstrate an inclination towards
violent ethnic
cleansing, have been the focus of considerable attention.
Norway, in common
with other countries, recognises two important principles. The first is that
national borders
cannot be violated and can therefore only be changed by peaceful means. The
second is that
human rights must be respected. Norway is also an adherent of the principle
that
European security
is incompatible with claims for ethnically clean states.
Russia
Developments in
Russia represent nonetheless the most vital challenge for Norwegian Foreign and
Security Policy.
Norway cannot exclude the possibility of a serious setback in Russian politics.
In
consequence of
this, efforts to draw Russia more closely towards the democratic cooperation in
Western European
have been declared to be of vital interest for Norway. Regional predecessors of
this are the
Barents Cooperation, established in 1993 and the Baltic Sea Council which was
set up
in 1992.
Big brother
In the opinion of
the Norwegian government, it would have been easier to integrate Russia had
Norway chosen to
become a member of the EU along with Sweden, Finland and Denmark. It is
more of a problem
to be left alone with the Russians in the far North. A small state does not
feel
safe as the
isolated neighbour of a superpower. In order to prevent the development of a
"Big
Brother
complex", Norway is interested in not being regarded as an isolated
country but as part of a
larger community.
For this reason non-Nordic countries are also welcome in regional cooperation.
The establishment
of the cooperative bodies in the Barents Region can be looked upon as Norway's
most important
single contribution to European East-West politics since the end of the Cold
War.
Norway is also
interested in further promoting Arctic cooperation by setting up a separate
cooperating
council which will be open for all countries with Arctic frontiers.
Military power
It is also of
importance that Russia, with its Soviet inheritance, is Europe's largest
military power in
both nuclear as
well as conventional terms, and that the political changes in the wake of the
Cold
War have resulted
in a proportionally larger share of Russian arms being deployed in areas
bordering on
Norwegian territory. North-western Russia has become the most important base
for
Russian naval
forces, including the naval component of the balance of terror. The withdrawal
of
Russian forces
from Central Europe and the former Soviet republics has led to an increase of
forces
in areas close to
Norway.
Even if Norway
accepts that European peace and security have been strengthened after the Cold
War, the country
is keen to ensure that it does not become marginalised in Allied security
policy as a
result of the
Alliance partners neglecting the military situation in the Far North. On a
purely military
level, the
Russian forces there do not represent the same kind of threat as Soviet forces
did earlier,
when they were
linked to an offensive military capacity in Central Europe. This is because the
Soviet
forces have now
been brought back home. There now exists a more advantageous security policy
situation, benefitting
Norway as well. However, even though these far northern forces are not
perceived as
representing a direct threat against Western Europe, certain worries are
nevertheless
expressed by
Norwegian politicians regarding the emergence of different ideas concerning
shared
security. This is
one of the reasons why Norway takes part in the formation of special NATO
emergency forces.
The intention is to make a contribution to solidarity abroad in order to
maintain
security at home.
Disarmament
Norway is deeply
interested in already existing disarmament agreements being respected, that
disarmament
continues to take place and it is extended to new areas.
Norway does not
want the CFE-agreement to be renegotiated at too early a stage.
The country is
following with great interest the implementation of the START-II agreement
which
reduces the
number of nuclear weapons in Russia and the USA respectively to 3000 and 3500
by
the year 2003.
Furthermore,
Novalja Semlja is Russia's only nuclear testing ground. Norway is working for a
complete test
ban. The country is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is engaged
in
international
efforts to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers.
Norway holds a
prominent posi
tion in the
campaign to abolish chemical weapons.
Pollution
Military based
pollution in north-western Russia represents a particular problem. It is caused
by
obsolescence,
dumping at sea and by overflowing stockpiles on land. Norway has worked towards
involving the USA
in the disarmament related pollution problems of North-western Russia, and has
been allocated
some of the funds in a programme started by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard
Lugar.
A considerable
pollution threat, albeit a non-military one, is represented by the nuclear
power plants
and other
industrial instal-lations in the area, such as the nickel smelters there.
Pollution in Norway
emanating from
Russia is more extensive than total pollution from Norwegian sources.
Cooperation
Put simply,
Norway would like to see as much international cooperation as possible in order
to
solve her
security problems in as wide a context as possible.
USA
It is the
Norwegian view that transatlantic relations with the USA are in a class of their
own. During
the Cold War, no
other country was able to play such an important role for Norwegian security as
the USA. There is
still a widely-held belief that nobody can replace the American commitment,
within the NATO
framework, to ensure Norwegian security.
No other country
can rival the USA's position as the leading proponent of disarmament, where
both
nuclear and
conventional arms are concerned.
Within NATO,
Norway has entered into a number of special agreements with the USA, such as
pre-positioning
of weapons and materiel for the marines and air force (COB), as well as other
forms
of explicit
military cooperation. Norway has helped limit the scope of cutbacks affecting
such
measures, thanks
to Defence Minister Kosmo's effective diplomacy. But Norway has also other
agreements with
other NATO countries which ensure allied support, for example the agreement
with
the
German-American unit NCF (NATO Composite Force).
Strategy
Norway supports
NATO's new strategy and forces concept enabling it to meet unforeseen
challenges
threatening member countries of the alliance.
Norway has put an
IRF battalion, an air squadron and a frigate at the disposal of NATO for
immediate
emergency deployment.
In the meantime,
two aspects have changed.
During the Cold
War, the greater strategic significance of Norwegian territory was so
considerable it
was reckoned that
alliance partners would quickly come to the assistance of the country in an
emergency.
The threat
against Norway was then so great that Norwegian forces had but one task - the
defence
of Norwegian
territory.
Now, by virtue of
her participation in the IRF, Norway has proclaimed her willingness to deploy
military forces,
in an allied context, outside of Norwegian territory. Moreover, this can be
seen as
the expression of
Norway's new resolve to demonstrate solidarity with her allied partners abroad,
in
order to
strengthen security cooperation with the same partners on home territory.
Transatlantic
From a Norwegian
viewpoint, every transatlantic debate in NATO has been fraught with a certain
anxiety lest the
European and the American members of the alliance should develop such
disagreements
that Norway would have to choose sides. Important strategic considerations link
Norway to the USA
in a special way. However, Norway is part of Europe geographically,
historically,
commercially and in other vital areas.
American policy
represents two challenges. The first is demilitarisation and withdrawal from
Europe.
The second is the
call to Western European countries to assume greater responsibility for their
own
security.
Both challenges
have a bearing on how Western European NATO members organise themselves. It
is of central
importance in this connection that the Western European Union (WEU) has been
chosen as NATO's
European pillar. Norway is an associated member of WEU.
At the same time
WEU has been named the defence arm of the European Union (EU). Full
membership of WEU
is only open to states who are EU members. Again, it is only EU member
countries who can
take part in EU's joint foreign and security policy (FUSP), which gives
security
policy a much
broader basis than the purely military. Thus the Norwegian EU question is
explicitly
linked to foreign
policy considerations.
Norway had since
the Spring of 1994 an accession treaty for EU membership, which was defended
not least from a
security policy standpoint. But in the referendum of November 28th 1994 a
majority of the
Norwegian people voted against membership.
Nordic
Foreign and
security policy cooperation between Nordic countries has developed rapidly
following
the Cold War era
when Swedish and Finnish neutrality gave rise questions of credibility.
Governments
looked upon such cooperation as a step towards anticipated EU-membership for
all
Nordic countries
(Iceland excepted). There are, however, no indications of a Norwegian
willingness
to establish any
form of isolated Nordic defence cooperation. The idea of a Scandinavian defence
union was tried
and rejected in 1948/49. Norway wants to remain in NATO, and as an associated
member of WEU at
the very least.
But following the
Norwegian people's rejection of the EU, there is a greater requirement to
stimulate
more
comprehensive Nordic cooperation. Norway is a part of the European Economic
Area
(EEA), and as
such is a sort of economic member of the EU, but without regular voting rights.
Rejection of
EU-membership does not mean the rejection of other types of cooperation. Also on
grounds of
security policy the Norwegian Government considers it important to fully
exploit the EEA
agreement's
regulations and semi-annual consultations.
FN
Norway's support
of the UN as the guarantor of international peace and security is dependent on
superpower
cooperation not being paralysed by veto. Norway has a long tradition of taking
part in
UN peacekeeping
operations. More than 1 per cent of Norway's entire population has served on
UN assignments.
This is probably a UN record.
After the Cold
War the UN has regained much of its original strength. Norway has extended her
UN involvement by
increasing the number of officers and troops on UN alert to 2000. Norway also
supports the
thinking behind a greater role for the UN by strengthening the UN's apparatus
for crisis
management and
operational leadership. Norway supports the new concept: keeping the peace,
which in certain
cases means a willingness to take up arms in order to restore peace.
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