In northern California this summer, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) unintentionally performed it's first operational
test of "free flight"; aviation without direct air traffic control.
This was an unintentional experiment because it was a result of a total
shut-down of the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC).
Although
Oakland is only the 16th busiest ARTCC, it's responsible for the largest block
of airspace of any ATC facility; 18 million square miles. Oakland directs all upper-level flight from
San Luis Obispo, California to the California/Oregon boarder, including most
Pacific oceanic routes. The failure happened at 7:13 a.m. local time during the
morning "departure push". Controllers estimated there were 60-80
aircraft under their control when the power died. All radar screens went dark
and all radios went silent. It took 45 minutes to restore radios and bring up a
backup radar system. It was more than an hour before the main radar
presentations came on line.
One controller described the sudden quiet in
the control suite as "the loudest silence I've ever heard" (UPI ,
1995). He went on to say there was "panic on everybody's face" as
they realized they had been rendered deaf, dumb, and blind by this catastrophic
equipment failure. It took a few minutes for controllers to realize the
shut-down had affected the entire facility. There was no book procedure to
cover this emergency scenario, so most controllers improvised.
Controllers in adjourning Los Angeles, Salt
Lake, and Seattle ARTCCs and various Terminal Radar Approach Controls (TRACON;
the level of radar coverage below upper-level ARTCC radar) were asked to take
control over all airspace within their radar coverage, and divert aircraft
under their control inbound to Northern California. Control towers in San
Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Sacramento, and other airports in the area were
instructed to hold all IFR departures on the ground. The most difficult problem
was getting notification to the airborne flight crews. In one case, controller
Mike Seko said, "We had Napa tower telling high altitude aircraft Oakland
Center had lost everything, and to switch to emergency frequencies" (Seko,
UPI, 1995). But most airborne aircraft on Oakland Center frequencies were in a
state of "lost-comm" unless they figured out what happened on the
ground and switched to another ARTCC or TRACON.
Flight crews did their own improvising. Some
pilots squawked VFR and continued the flight on their own. Others continued on
their previously issued clearance, while others climbed into or descended out
of Class A airspace without a clearance.
Later analysis tells us one of the biggest
problems was nobody believed a prolonged outage like this could occur. Both
controllers and supervisors worked on the assumption their radar and radios
would come back "any moment now". The same thought process prevailed
at Bay (Oakland) TRACON where operations were paralyzed by the Center's blackout.
It's impossible to say how many separation
losses occurred during the hour-long episode. Some near mid-air reports were
filed, but the vast majority of separation-loss situations will probably go
unreported. After power was restored, and the primary radar system was returned
to operation, extensive air traffic delays, diversions, and flight
cancellations persisted for many hours at Bay area airports, especially
departures from San Francisco International.
We may never know the full aftermath of this
incident. Changes will be made as to how power is fed to ATC facilities, and
how maintenance is performed. Contingency plans will be rewritten and
controllers will be trained how to implement them. Meanwhile, controllers
nation wide are brushing up on their non-radar and lost-comm procedures.
After an extensive investigation, it's
now clear why the failure occurred. One of three power sources was down for
maintenance testing. The second power source failed unexpectedly. When
technicians tried to bring the third power source on-line, a faulty circuit
board failed in a critical power panel, preventing power from being restored.
Oakland Center was completely dead.
This was the story of one air traffic control
facility's system failure. Don't think this was an isolated incident though. A
partial list of this years ATC radar failures:
· Chicago Center
lost their primary radar system when the 1970's technology IBM 9020E host
computer went down for 29 hours.
· ASR-9 radar
failure at Miami TRACON possibly due to a lighting strike. Miami switched to a
back-up ASR-9 system at Fort Lauderdale. The Fort Lauderdale system then failed
just as technicians at Miami brought their radar on-line. Miami failed again
forcing controllers to revert to non-radar procedures.
· Fort Worth
Center's host computer lost power while technicians were replacing some related
processing equipment. Back-up radar was on-line for almost three hours. All
departures experienced a 60-90 minute delays.
· Pittsburgh
TRACON briefly lost communication and radar with 38 flights in the air. Radar
contact was lost for 5-8 minutes.
Everyone from vacationing families to the
director of the Federal Aviation Administration recognizes the national air
traffic control system is in desperate need of reform. Host computer systems
are 20 years old, power supplies are at times unreliable, and facilities are
under-manned with over-worked controllers. Moral is low at facilities because
of these problems. The main problem that currently plagues the system though is
who's going to take charge of the situation and with what reform plan. The
controllers union has their reform plan as does the FAA and the law makers in
Washington. These groups fight amongst themselves to promote their
reconstruction plan, but meanwhile nothing's accomplished and the skies stay
unsafe.
The National Air Traffic Controllers
Association (NATCA) is the union that replaced the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO). NATCA, representing the controller work force, supports a plan to
structure the air traffic control branch of the FAA. NATCA endorses the
government corporation concept for air traffic control because, "it goes
furthest towards correcting the FAA's personnel, procurement, and budgetary
problems" (NATCA policy statement, 1995). The union goes on to say they'll
back any legislative measure that addresses at a minimum, the following
personnel, procurement, and budgetary
concerns:
· Provides for
protection of retirement, benefits, and job security consistent with applicable
laws, rules, and regulations.
· Need for
long-term leadership at the FAA.
· Provide the FAA
with the ability to hire personnel when needed and allow individuals to
transfer to where they're needed most, regardless of artificial hiring/managing
caps.
· Provide the FAA
with the ability to attract and retain high caliber individuals.
· Allow the FAA
and its recognized unions, the ability to seek a more streamlined and factual
classification system.
· Provides a
flexible procurement system that mitigates the effects the appropriations
process has on large contracts, allows for more off-the-shelf purchasing, and
reforms the contracting appeals process.
· Provides some
relief from the Budget Enforcement Act.
· Allows for
increased (but reasonable) user and internal union input.
NATCA
actively lobbies their concerns how ATC reform should occur. James Poole is the
Vice President of NATCA's Great Lakes Region. In September of this year, he
testified before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's
Aviation Subcommittee. He presented an air traffic control system that was
"in a state of distress" . He went on to say the numerous equipment
outages nationwide is an indicator the system is moving towards failure.
Although he gave credit to FAA Administrator David Hinson for some reform
actions (such as canceling the failed Advanced Automation System), he debated
the administrators claim the ATC system was "99.4% reliable." Poole
said, "they (the FAA) are striving to maintain user confidence in the
system but their strategy tends to trivialize very serious system
deficiencies." (UPI, 1995) Again, Poole offered NATCA's recommendation to
Congress and the FAA on how to assist the crumbling air traffic control system:
· Reform the
procurement policies so new technology enters the system while it's new
technology.
· Provide better
funding mechanisms for the FAA
· Authorize and
fund hiring an additional 1,500 controllers.
· Implement a
vehicle to attract high caliber controllers at the busiest facilities.
Many NATCA controllers believe they are able to
survive each day's shift in spite of their equipment, not because of it. It's a
known fact the technology contained in a laptop computer outperforms the
capacity of the IBM 9020E that supports all FAA radar facilities. NATCA goes on
to the claim the digital clarity of a cellular phone is light-years ahead of
the antiquated radios now used to
communicate. John Carr is an air traffic controller at Chicago O'Hare TRACON
and is that facility's representative for NATCA. His analogy follows; "Our
nation has entered the on-ramp of the information superhighway. The FAA can't
even get their Pinto out of the driveway". (AP, 1995)
In 1989, the Chicago System Safety and
Efficiency Review recommended that a new TRACON be built. A new TRACON and
tower at O'Hare were built and are set for commissioning in late 1996. The
price for the TRACON building alone was $100 million dollars. The equipment
will cost $200 million dollars. NATCA proposes though, "it's just radios
and radar". The union reiterates the FAA has once again chosen to ignore
their most valuable resource; the working air traffic controller. Carr said the
transition plan to the new TRACON calls for 77 controllers working six-day
workweeks in order to man both facilities. This is required so there's orderly
training, testing, and transition. According to Carr, there are only 67
controllers, and seven of those are leaving. The staffing for the new TRACON
will be 21 controllers per shift. Using the FAA's own Staffing Standard Plan,
O'Hare TRACON should have 30 controllers per shift. Carr says, "this is
woefully inadequate and we believe it does a disservice to the user".
Speaking before Congress, Carr testified to the following:
I am here to tell
you that without additional staffing, there will be no improvement in service,
and no decrease in delays. I can tell you that without 77 controllers on board
and certified by September of 1996, we can't even begin to transition to the
new facility. (UPI, 1995)
NATCA is just one force in the march towards
ATC reform. The concerns shown at O'Hare's facilities are shared nation-wide.
As preoccupation with daily operations rise, inversely goes worker moral. An
internal report from the FAA on New York Center reveals staff moral is low,
training is poor, and there's a shortage of controllers. The internal review of
New York Center was conducted following the Center's insistence it would be
forced to limit air traffic through its airspace because of training and staffing
shortcomings. The NATCA representative for New York Center said staffing still
needed to be increased by at least 30%. The union representative went on to
say, "the facility is screaming for people and upper management seems
oblivious to that fact. They're trying to run the facility on a shoestring.
They're overworking the controllers by leaps and bounds" (AP, 1995).
There's almost always more than one solution to
every problem, and the question of how to reform the ATC system is no
exception. The FAA believes restructuring should come from within. They believe
there are still recoverable parts from the current system. The FAA also
downplays many of NATCA's concerns over airspace safety. And more
time-consuming debate continues.
The FAA boasts they spend the majority of their
resources operating an air traffic control
system that
handles an average of two flights per second, every minute, every hour, 365
days a year. In one day , the U. S.
commercial aviation industry will move approximately 1.5 million passengers
safely to their destination. Strangely enough, they're proud of the fact they
have 5,000 fewer employees than in 1991,
yet air traffic has grown more than 6 percent over the last two years. They
claim a 99.4 percent reliability rate in all their operations. Further
disclosure reveals the FAA budget experienced a real decline for the first time
in more than a decade. A six percent drop. That equates to six hundred million
dollars. The FAA thinks the Clinton Administration has a solution. It's a
not-for-profit, government-owned-and-operated U. S. Air Traffic Services
(USATS) corporation. According to the FAA, a corporation makes good sense. They
say unlike other FAA functions, air traffic has many of the characteristics of
a business. And it should be run like a
business -- financing itself through the collection of users' fees. The
corporation would be free from government procurement and personnel rules. As
an independent corporation, it would be
able to respond rapidly to changes in the aviation industry. It would have the
financial resources to keep pace with -- and take advantage of -- advances in
technology. Most importantly, it would not be subject to budget cuts or
constraints, nor would it be hostage to the annual appropriations process.
Transportation Secretary Peña transmitted
proposed legislation to create the United
States Air
Traffic Service corporation (USATS) on April 6th. On May 3rd, President Clinton
wrote to Senate Republican Leader Dole and House Speaker Gingrich, urging them
to enact the USATS legislation now. The FAA says the "now" is
critical. They believe the proposed budgets they're seeing would have a drastic
impact on the services offered to the
American public. In remarks delivered by FAA Deputy Administrator Linda Hall
Daschle to the Professional Airways Systems Specialists, "without USATS or
some other creative financing proposal, we will face reductions in our work
force -- including our safety work force...cuts in programs to protect against
runway incursions at smaller airports...critical delays in weather safety
programs". (FAA World Wide Web Home Page, 1995)
"This proposal was not a hasty one",
said FAA Administrator David R. Hinson, while speaking to the National Airspace
System (NAS) Architecture Meeting. "It was the result of a thorough
analysis of the need for greater flexibility in personnel and procurement
policies". (FAA World Wide Web Home Page, 1995) In the director's eyes,
the corporation is designed to prevent any long-term erosion in the quality of
the nation's air traffic services.
If and
when the legislation is finalized (alternatives to the original bill are being
debated in Congress, and will be discussed later), there will be a one-year
transition period. USATS would take over operation of the air traffic control
system on October 1, of the following fiscal year. The transfer of operating
responsibility will not occur until the FAA Administrator determined two
things. First, all essential transition items must have been accomplished.
Second, the transfer must be accomplished with no detrimental impact on system
safety. Deputy Administrator Daschle went on to say:
I think there is
a broad consensus that it's time to change personnel and procurement rules so
that the FAA can better manage for results. None of the bills introduced in
Congress addresses our acute financial situation. They all expect us to do the same job without
giving us the necessary funding. It's a little like trying to fly a 747 using
just two of its four engines. You can do it -- but it certainly isn't the best
way to fly. And it certainly can't do the job for which it's intended. (FAA
World Wide Web Home Page, 1995)
These are Administrator Hinsosn's plans for an
overhaul of the administrative structure of the FAA. But what's being done
right now to fix the radar outages occurring on an almost daily basis? How will
they respond to the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) call for the
FAA to come up with some "quick fixes" for what appears to be a
pattern of avoidable failures? The NTSB said in a news release this summer:
The FAA should
give controllers more training on the Center's main back-up mode (Direct Access
Radar Channel, or DARC), hire more technicians to fix the broken equipment, and
to closely monitor the short-term replacement radar system, the Display Channel
Complex Rehost System (DCCR). (AP,
1995)
The FAA's response has been to put in
"hurry-up" orders for the DCCR system. They'll put in computer
replacement orders for five ARTCCs. The ancient IBM 9020Es that run Center
radar and tracking systems are based on '70s technology. They've been slated
for replacement since the mid '80s. But because of FAA mismanagement and
difficulties in procurement, the equipment buys have been stalled. FAA chief
Hinson said the FAA will proceed with DCCR purchases to replace host processors
at Chicago, New York, Washington, and Fort Worth centers. The DCCR system was
put into motion faster than originally planned because of another failed FAA
reform plan, the Advanced Automation Project. The idea was to almost totally
automate the nations air traffic system with a series of ground based computers
transmitting navigational instructions ensuring proper separation to airborne
aircraft equipped with receivers that would interpret the signals and adjust
the aircraft's flight path. There would have been very little human involvement
in routine separation. As is the recent track record of the FAA, the automated
ATC system has been completely bogged down in contracting, procurement, and
budget dilemmas.
The cost of buying and installing the five
systems is estimated at $65 million dollars. The first system won't go on-line
until early 1997, at Chicago Center. The other four systems, according to the
FAA schedule, will follow at the rate of one a month.
The equipment, procurement, and budget problems
the FAA experiences isn't confined to the air traffic control system. The
entire agency is bogged down in a maze of government over-control. The FAA's
procurement of the Automated Surface Observing System (SOS) parallels equipment
problems in recent history.
SOS is deigned to replace on-airport weather
observers. Equipment is supposed to detect weather phenomena critical to
aviation, then transmit it to air traffic controllers, pilots, and other
concerned agencies. The FAA in conjunction with the National Weather Service
and the Department of Defense manages the program. During the last year, over
480 SOS systems have been installed, but only 42 systems are commissioned for
aviation and weather system use. At 30 of those 42 sites, SOS is used by air
traffic controllers to ensure compliance with aviation standards and Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR). Air Traffic controllers, pilots, and weather
observers have raised serious concerns about SOS. They say the equipment
doesn't observe and report some of the most basic weather conditions (e.g.
thunderstorms, cloud layers above, 12,000 feet, drizzle). Since human observers
report every weather element, the loss of these conditions in weather reports
is directly attributed to SOS. The system doesn't even correctly report the
most basic weather condition; wind speed
and direction. It's reported the wind sensors freeze in cold weather.
A loss of timely and accurate weather reporting
would be devastating to the aviation industry. There have been too numerous
aviation accidents caused by unreported or undetected weather conditions.
Controllers and pilots alike agree that SOS represents a serious degradation of
service to the aviation community. They call for an immediate return to manned
observation stations until improvements are made to the automated style of
weather reporting.
How
could the FAA and other national agencies miss these system deficiencies? Even
with all the criticism coming from every corners of the aviation environment,
contractors continue to install and commission SOS. Unbelievable.
The reform of the nation's air traffic control
system is not just one plan laid out by one person or group. On Capitol Hill, where the final formula will be decided on,
there are several bills before various House and Senate committees. Some call
for an air traffic control structure that's totally separate from the federal
government, another calls for the government to run a quasi-independent ATC
system, plan. Whatever the outcome is, the desire is basically the same;
eliminate the government procurement nightmare and allow money to flow into the
equipment buyers hands.
A bill to separate the Federal Aviation
Administration from the Department of Transportation has already won support from the House
Transportation subcommittee. In a rare showing of bipartisan politics, the
subcommittee unanimously passed the measure and sent it up to the full
committee. The legislation would make the FAA an independent agency, free to
set up it's own rules for personnel moves and procurement. The organization
would be exempt from federal budget restraints, and have total authority to
spend it's portion of the Aviation Trust Fund as it saw fit. Representative
James Oberstar, author of the bill said, "Today is the day when we begin
to unscramble the egg that was scrambled in 1966 when nearly a dozen federal
agencies were combined into the DOT. It worked for some agencies, but not for
the FAA". (AP, 1995) The bill has almost total backing from the aviation
community, but is opposed by the Clinton administration. As discussed earlier,
the Clinton Administration is fully behind the formation of the United States
Air Traffic Service corporation which would total privatize ATC services. .
Another bill circulating is sponsored by
Senator John McCain. His bill would make the FAA a quasi-independent agency
financed largely through user fees. Obviously, this legislation has almost no
support from those who would be forced to finance the majority of the system;
aircraft owners, pilots and the general aviation community. They are afraid
they would be obliged to provide the revenue to fund the reformed FAA. Fee
structure would be based on aircraft performance. Commercial and business jets
would be charged for ATC services based on the above. Opponents to this measure
ask, "If we want a higher altitude, will the controller ask for a major
credit card?" (AP, 1995)
FAA
Administrator David Hinson has praised this bill saying it would "give the
FAA greater flexibility in purchasing and managing personnel". The McCain
bill is seen as a compromise to the administration's efforts, but still relies
heavily on user fees.
Representative Jim Lightfoot has proposed to
reform the FAA from within. Along with Representative John Duncan (head of the
House Aviation Subcommittee), their bill would give the FAA independent-agency
status, removing it from the Department of Transportation. Lightfoot said,
"our legislation will streamline the FAA, reform the costly and often
delayed rule-making process, and increase aviation safety." The
legislation is seen by some as an attempt to counter the USATS proposal by
President Clinton. It also appears many aircraft owners and pilots support this
reform action.
There is quite an array of legislation proposed
to reform our nation's aging, outdated air traffic control system. One has to
suppose each effort has the good of the consumer in mind as time ticks by
without any changes.
The
following is an editorial that appeared in the September 4, 1995 edition of the
Federal Times. It was written by a controller at Denver Center:
Last year, air travelers flew 520 billion
miles within the U.S. air traffic control system. This year that system seems
to be falling apart. Each time an air traffic control center's radar shuts
down, every traveler blinks and gulps. When air traffic controllers hand out
scary literature in airports and air traffic control outages are separated by
days instead of years, it's time for some serious attention to the system. That
being the case, you'd think we'd have invested time, talent cash in the best
darn air traffic control system the world had ever seen. Instead we're limping
along with computers whose vacuum tubes are the butt of jokes on late-night
television shows. Too often, our controllers are silenced and blinded by
technical failures -- 11 since last September. Glitches force controllers to
pass planes between centers via telephone. Now even backup systems have started
to fail. As it has tried to update its now 30-year-old machinery, the Federal
Aviation Administration has become a budgetary black hole. A May General
Accounting Office review found modernization contract completion dates slipping
and sliding as costs mount. Congress has wrung a pledge from FAA for an interim
fix in 1997 at five of 20 big centers, with the other 15 to be upgraded by
1998. That's a small start, but little solace to fliers. It's time for
legislators and aviation administrators to call a halt to this Russian roulette
in the skies. Quit waiting for accidents and outcry to prod action. Get the
equipment tested, functioning and in place. Staff towers and centers to match
the growing number of planes. Breathe hard down the necks of the officials
responsible until it gets done and done right. Get us the system we deserve and
have paid for. Do it now. (World Wide
Web, FAA Homepage, 1995)
The Oakland Center nightmare could have caused
the largest loss of life from an aviation-related accident. There literally
could have been bodies and airplane wreckage falling from the skies throughout
Northern California. But thankfully, it didn't happen. The day was saved by
every controller working western America's airspace that day. The day was saved
by pilots that followed previously assigned clearances, and those that were
worthy enough aviators to weave their way through uncontrolled, but not
uncrowded airspace.
Everyone's got an opinion. In this case,
everyone knows the best way to fix the crumbling airways. NATCA wants the FAA
structures as a corporation would be. But the union goes on to say they'll
support any legislation that meets their laundry list of concerns. The FAA
wants to restructure the system from within. The also support the notion of
freeing their agency from the procurement, budgeting, and hiring stranglehold
they're under from the federal government. And then our nation's lawmakers got
involved. There are approximately five variations the basic reform bill making
their way around Capitol Hill. There's a plan to totally privatize the FAA,
another to partly privatize it, another to rework it from within, and a few
other variations of those. Legislators have their own reasons to support
certain bills; is our safety one of them?
The Federal Times editorial sums up an everyday
controllers concern. He's the one working with that aged computer equipment,
he's the one working the unnecessarily long shifts, he's the one scared every
day his screen will go dark during the morning rush hour. I would be inclined
to listen very closely to his concerns and follow his recommendations towards a
solution.
The FAA's Quality statement declares the agency
as an organization dedicated to
"eliminating barriers, improving communication, providing additional
opportunities for training, and constantly encouraging all personnel to seek
ways to improve". The FAA is proud of its Quality activities because they
"foster such initiatives as continuous improvement of work processes,
empowerment of employees, partnering of labor and management, and
re-engineering". (World Wide Web FAA Home-page, 1995) These are very lofty
goals that always require improvement. But will disaster strike before their
processes gets us a new ATC system?
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