Robert Bork's The
Right of Privacy examined the landmark case Griswald v. Conneticut. Bork's
"originalist" view proclaimed that Justice Douglas erroneously
interpreted the right of privacy from the Constitution. The originalist view is
that judges must strictly adhere to the language of the Constitution, thus
people do not have a general right to privacy because it was never actually
written into the Constitution. This view severely restricts judges in dealing
with new issues that our forefathers could not have possibly envisioned. The
inability of "originalist" to deal with modern and future problems
displays a need for Supreme Court judges to be able to interpret laws from the
Constitution. Without this ability it
would be doubtful if people today could claim a general right to privacy.
The Griswald case
involved a bizarre law that forbade the use of condoms in the hope that it
would prevent adulterous affairs. This deduction is as absurd as banning all
sales of chocolate in order to prevent obesity.
Robert Bork
admitted that this law did not make sense, especially in the ability of
government officials to enforce the law. Yet, Bork disagreed with the method
used by Justice Douglas to overturn the conviction of two doctors distributing
information on condoms. Bork felt that Douglas's liberal use of penumbras to
create a zone of privacy was an excessive use of judicial power. Bork feels a
judge must follow the Constitution and should not imply anything from the
various ideas in the Constitution. This poses problems when trying to deal with
cases that the Constitution does not specifically mention. For example, without
the ability to interpret some of the various amendments in the constitution it
would be virtually impossible for a judge to decide cases dealing with the
on-line world. Is an on-line service provider similar to a magazine publisher
(Responsible for the information that it disseminates) or like a bookstore
(That is not specifically liable for the information that it disseminates)?
These types of decisions cannot be solved with an "originalist" view,
because the Constitution did not have the foresight to deal with such issues.
In this same manner Justice Douglas implements penumbras to arrive at a general
right of privacy that is not explicitly written into the Constitution. These
penumbras are all valid within the spirit of the Constitution and does not go
against anything specifically forbidden in the document. Thus, the
justification of Justice Douglas to create a zone of privacy is legitimate and
the old archaic Griswald laws is forever vanquished into the history books.
Justice Douglas writes;
"Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment...The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers...The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms 'the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures'...The Fifth Amendment in its Self Incrimination Clause...The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The Enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." (Pg.124)
Bork also
complained that Justice Douglas was being quite the alarmist by implying that
the Griswald case would never be enforced. "There was, of course, no
prospect that it ever would be enforced." (Pg. 133) It is not very
assuring to my own peace of mind, when one defends an offensive law by stating
that it's never going to be used. It only takes one ambitious politician to
selectively enforce these laws for their own prejudice or gain. Bork complained
that Douglas imagined "horrible events...that never happened, never will,
and could be stopped by the courts if they ever seemed about to happen."
(Pg. 134) It should have dawned upon Mr. Bork that Justice Douglas and his
colleagues was precisely the court that would stop those horrible events from
ever happening.
The "originalist" philosophy is
admirable in its use of such a strict discipline in interpreting the
Constitution, yet the ultimate lack of flexibility in addressing modern
problems in the Constitution is far to binding. The role of judges is
ultimately based upon arbitrating what is right or wrong from the laws
themselves, but when a problem arises that is not addressed within the
laws/Constitution, then judges must be able to imply decisions based on the
general spirit of the original document. Basically, if the Constitution does
not specifically prohibit a right, and most amendments concur with that right,
then it is permissible for judges to create rights like privacy. It would be
most problematic if we had a strict "originalist" judicial history
because blacks would be only 3/5 of a person, women would never have been
enfranchised, and the Senate would still be chosen by the House of Legislature.
The Supreme Court (consisting of the most
learned and able legal experts in the country) should have the ability to
interpret certain aspects of the Constitution in order to prevent the
Constitution from becoming a dated, historical document. Problems will continue
to rise that the fathers of this country could not have possibly envisioned.
Robert Bork's "originalist" view is far too restrictive in practice
to allow the Constitution to be as vital today as it was 200 years ago.
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