Boyko Iaramov
Introduction to
International Relations
Professor Bond
More than thirty
years have passed since the dramatic cling of arm in the remote Himalayan
region of the Sino-Indian border. This Time gap seems to be appropriate for a
correct reexamination of the conflict. The account of India's attempt to find
balance with China, ever since the Kongska Pass incident in 1959 until the attack
of 1962, is not merely a fact sheet that
we can brows and toss and toss away. In stead we have to link each idea to the
event and causes that might have played a role in the conflict.
Ever since 1959 the border problem between
Asia's biggest two nation-states has been picking up speed at a threatening
speed. The year 1962 was the unfortunate year for India which knocked out any
possibility of understanding between China and India. Of course, such an act of
terror could have not started without some kind of the reason, whatever it
may be. The chronological order of
pre-crisis decisions taken India's authorities are of great importance.
The role of the decision-makers before the time
of the armed conflict had a big significance for India's position on political
and economic matters in the continent of Asia. A major figure in India's
decision making was Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the Congress Party, head of the
Planning Commission and chief spokesman of
the government in Parliament. These titles not only made him an
important nationalistic figure but also Gandhi's appointed heir and a
"major architect of India's political institutions" (Brecher, 1959).
Krishna Menon, "the controversial defense minister consulted in almost
every issue" along with Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant was also a figure of
great importance (Langyel, 1962). This importance was mainly derived from the
fact that both shared the same overall world view of Nehru. However, in order
to understand the cruicial importance of decision-makers, we shall looked
seperately at each of India's top men.
Menon was highly important and useful to Nehru
in the essence that the latter helped Nehru convey his thought and policies to
the outside world in a forceful and organized manner (Brecher, 1959). But as
Rajani Palme Dutt said in his book "The problem of India," foreign
policy was exercised "more behind the scenes than in meetings of the
committee." Both Menon and Nehru acted to the desire of Nehru. It was
often when the Foreign secretary would take to Pant drafts of diplomatic
correspondence and get the reaction which was usually at Nehru's request
(Hoffmann,1990).
Foreign policy makers Nehru, Menon and Pant
shared a common world view which clearly showed their psychological
predisposition, drawn from the sources of their personality, idiosyncrasy,
ideology, tradition, culture and history. As we shall see further down, in the
mainstream of common ideas and beliefs, they indeed had some differences. But
all these men used the "attitudinal prism" (Hoffmann, 1990), the lens
through which they filtered and structured the information thus perceiving the
world. One set of Indian beliefs referred to the role India should play world.
This role was supposed to reflect the fact that India was a considerably new nation-state.
India also had to preserve her independence of
action. It didn't simply fight for independence simply to become a camp
follower of any of the Cold War Power
blocs. The restrictions and limitations that such a position imply would be
against India's national interest. And it was exactly this nonalignment policy
of Nehru between the two sides of the Cold War which was the projection of
Indian nationalism into world affairs (Maxwell, 1970). Nehru also expressed the
idea that India was an Asian power that should not be overlooked at. He
demonstrated that "in regard to any major problem of a country or a group
of countries of Asia, India has to be considered" (Gopal, 1980).
During the 1950's and 1960's Nehru and his
advisors realized that India was playing a far more than neutral role in the
Cold War politics. She was a very important player on the world stage, where
questions of war and peace were decided. He recognized that in s bipolar world,
in which relations between the superpowers were based mainly on
"balance-of-power calculations" (Hoffmann, 1990), a nuclear
holocaust, for example, had become highly likely. He sought that India should
stay out of the superpowers' way in the nuclear arms race and at the same time
work to the reduction of superpower confrontation by "fostering
communication, engaging in constructive diplomacy and public judging each
action of the United States and the former Soviet Union on its merits"
(Brecher, 1959). Nehru strongly believed that this trend will only act to the
good of India, for it was "economic development that was the countries
primary goal" (Hoffmann, 1990). So the act of nonalignment was an act of
peace and not hostility. A nonalignment
trend will also allow India to receive development aid from "as many
countries as could be persuaded to contribute" (Hoffmann, 1990), whatever
their Cold War leanings. India's prime minister was well aware that at the
present state the country could not spent considerable amount of resources for
a large defense establishment. An India aligned with no Cold War Power bloc
would help avoid alienating nations like former Soviet Union and China, which
were of great importance to India's security. Nehru himself realized that a
hostile frontier with China, for example, would mean an expenditure of all
Indian resources just to defend it (Gopal, 1980).
Another standard belief that Nehru and the rest
of his associates developed in India's foreign policy affairs was the so called
image making (Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru developed the complex "images"
of nations, governments, international trends and situations. Of course, as later will be shown, they were
subject to change, but not that easily. So in the way of image making, Nehru
had made it a fundamental view of Indian
foreign policy to treat former Soviet Union and
China as separate powers, passing two different sets of problems. So,
right now, there was no reason for him not to forge the friendliest possible
relationship with former Soviet Union.
The image that Nehru set for the United States
was one of more persistent work. The anti-communism phobia that was shaking the
United States at the time, made it very hard for Indian authority to set its
right relations with the U.S. But still, according to Nehru, relations could be
kept constructive and could be improved once the U.S. overcame their suspicion
of nonalignment. Another reason for the obstruction of Indo-American relations was the U.S. policy
toward arming Pakistan military, thereby threatening India military.
As the result of this momentous post
independence decision of India's authority, once again primarily Nehru and
Krishna Menon, the country had accepted membership in the remains of the
British Empire - the Commonwealth (Hoffmann, 1990). This important tie assured India,
that despite of nonalignment it would never be completely isolated. It would be
granted communication with the West and other Third World countries, members
once again in the Commonwealth, and as a result Indian diplomatic influence
would be enhanced. It was both the importance of a continued British supply of
military equipment and the possibility of trade and economic assistance that
made this membership so valuable.
China,
however, was the biggest element of concern. Nehru never had the element of
doubt that China's position in the communist world will constitute a problem to
India (Gopal, 1980). His largeness of mind led him to the hope that the
tradition of nearly two thousand years of peace could continue in an era of
Indian and Chinese national reassertion.
He was determined to prevent the former
Soviet Union and China from
combining powers against India. But he also knew that the Chinese as well as
the Russians were acting on the strength of their own national foreign policy
interests and imperatives.
In the 1950's Nehru realized, as he carried out
in a letter to a member of the Chinese authority, that India very well
understood the problems China was facing after the prolong suffer and struggle
against Japan. He also understood that the successful communist revolution in
China added new feeling to the political palette of China. Thus he perceived it
as a "mixture of bitterness, elation and vaunting confidence to which the traditional xenophobia and present day isolation from outside contacts
have added suspicion of the motives of other powers" (Brecher, 1959). For
two years he elaborated on these points, when describing China as on object of
study by India's Intelligence Bureau. In a briefing he told IB officers that
during centuries Indian and Chinese cultures had contested for supremacy in
Central Asia and Tibet, as well as in Burma and other places in Southeast Asia.
Thus, conflict between India and China had never been direct, but there had
been intense indirect competition, which was continuing (Hoffmann, 1990).
Furthermore,
China had shown the tendency to be "aggressive" (Maxwell, 1970).
On the coarse of
logic, it was expected that once China had achieved a certain political and
economic stability, it would seek some form of supremacy, and influence or even
supremacy in Asia. And what lay in the path of the realization of this idea was
India. Nehru was afraid that to achieve their ends, the Chinese might attempt
to prove their superiority over India in the sphere of political and economic
might or even occupy some Southeast Asian countries. A tool that the Chinese
might have used, according to Nehru, was the strong lobby of the Communist
party which could stand up and support the Chinese cause in any dispute with
India's government (Maxwell, 1970).
From Nehru's standpoint, China's emergence from
the bonds of Western imperialism could release negative political and character
traits. India would have to be alert, especially on the northern frontier. In
1952 China had no immediate intention to recognize the India-Tibet border
formally. He expected China to extend its influence over frontier territory
once the Chinese position in Tibet had been consolidated. And as a contra
action of that he developed India's frontier administration (Maxwell, 1970).
Throughout most of the 1950's, however, other
beliefs received more emphasis both ion the public and the private spheres.
Nehru along with Menon and other high officials that a friendly relationship
between China and India could be established, if Tibet was removed as an
irritant and China was brought out of isolation into a world of emerging or
reemerging nation (Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru knew that the outcome of such a
relationship will bring much to do peace in Asia and that is the reason he
considered it to outweigh his concerns about Tibet. The founding belief of
Nehru was that Tibet was a part of China, "although it should be allowed
as much autonomy as possible" (Hoffmann, 1990). India had formally
recognized China's right on Tibet and after 1954 was bound to do so with a the
Sino-Indian trade agreement.
After Nehru returned from a visit to China in
1954 he spoke of the great Chinese achievements in both the economic and social
spheres. But even before that trip Nehru has sought to follow the Chinese steps
of progress; that is, "India should regard China as a standard of
comparison not as open rival" (Hoffmann, 1990). India would follow its own
unique strategy of economic development. That particular strategy called for "government-directed
economic planning, a government-controlled public sector of utilities and
industries, and a cooperative but independent private sector" (Hoffmann,
1990).
The
climax of the conflict, as to Nehru, came in the fall of 1959 when China's
behavior which through his "attitudinal prism" led him to alter the
previous image of China. The final and most serious border problem completed a
intensifying process where Nehru adopted a new set of beliefs concerning the
Chinese beliefs concerning Chinese motives for starting the border conflict.
Those beliefs were firstly that China was definitely acting
"arrogant" and imbued with feelings of superiority. The second belief
was that China was a revolutionary and unsatisfied power which at the time was
in aggressive mood. Third belief was that China was an expansionist country,
which meanwhile was strong internally. Fourth came the belief that Chinas
attempt to influence and pressure India was due to Communist ideology. The
fifth believe was that all these previously mentioned traits have been
strengthened by the recent isolation imposed on China by the West. Paranoidity
and one-track mind was the sixth believe.
And following from the latter believe came idea that China would, therefore,
not be interested in the kind of border settlement that India could accept
(Hoffmann, 1990). Thus Prime Minister Nehru pictured China as a hostile country
predisposed to harm India and the strength of deep-seated emotions.
The Sino-Indian
border problem seen through the "attitudinal prism" of Defense
Minister Krishna Menon was different from Nehru's view. Even though Menon and
Nehru were on the same side of the battle, they indeed shared some differences.
While Nehru was following the concepts of Marxism and Leninism, Menon pursued
"Laski's neo-Marxism" of the 1930's (Langyel, 1962). In that way he
retained a basic acceptance of the Leninist theory of imperialism which
according to Menon outgrew capitalism. The Defense Minister's images of India's
neighbors were also strongly influenced by his distrust of imperialism and
capitalism. The "central place of
Menon's assault of Imperialism in the 1950's and 1960's was prescribed to the
United States, which in the eyes of Menon was the major Western power which was
inclined to intervene in the affairs of the non-Western world" (Langyel,
1962). Due to that he considered not China, but Pakistan to be the main threat
to India's security. For Pakistan, after independence, had become tied up to
the new American imperialist system through a treaty and the acceptance of
military aid. As an American client Pakistan weakened the area of peace and
served the instrument with which imperialism could threat India's security.
In contrast to Nehru's vision of China, Krishna
Menon had a very positive image it. Although he rejected totalitarian methods
anywhere he viewed China as a progressive, modern and socialist state. The
Defense Minister also felt a kind of "spiritual kinship" with China
(Langyel, 1962). And even when the India-China relations edged in 1959 Menon
still regarded China as all but an enemy. In stead he argued that the boarder
incidents rose from the fact that China considered that the Tibetan refugees in
India might return to Tibet and start a rebellion. Other Chinese motives
underlying the border problem, according to Menon, were firstly that a certain
Chinese "despondency" over internal economic problems existed and
secondly the youthful, aggressive passion of the Chinese revolution (Langyel,
1962). All through the pre-crisis period Krishna Menon believed that
frustration caused by the international isolation imposed on communist China
was the factor which aided and guided the formation of the
Japanese attitudes.
Throughout the
whole conflict he remained certain that China had taken India mistakenly as
representing threat from the
imperialist West.
On the question how to deal with the
Sino-Indian conflict, Menon became the leading defender of a new school of
thought. To that school the territorial disagreement between China and India was
genuine, and not a reflection of deeper Chinese hostility.
According to the
school a political settlement with the Chinese could be reached and might also
include territorial compromise (Langyel, 1962).
In the political battle between India and China
a lot of hard decisions had to be made. The authority of decision-making, as we
saw, laid mainly in the hands of a few people in the high levels of the Indian authority building. Their
appropriate actions in the Sino-Chinese border problem were of crucial
importance. Some of them were hard to be taken, others were voted secretly and
even some decisions were left undecided. India's correct evaluation of its conflict with China
enabled her to act accordingly and carry out its plans in such a chronological
order that would be best for its national security. The importance of correct
decision-making and the ability to choose right from wrong is the single most
important feature each political leader should try to control to the rate of
perfection.
Sources of
Information:
Brecher, Michael.
(1959). Nehru: A Political Bibliography. Oxford University Press:
London.
Dutt, Rajani
Palme. (1943). The Problem of India. International Publishers: New York
Gopal, Sarvepolli.
(1980). Jawaharlal Nehru. Oxford University Press: Delhi.
Hoffmann, Steven.
(1990). India & China in Crisis. University of California Press:
London.
Langyel, Emil.
(1962). Krishna Menon. Walker & Company: New York
Maxwell, Neville.
(1970). India's China War. Pantheon Books: New York.
No comments:
Post a Comment